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1. Introduction 
 
In 2009, many Western countries commemorated Calvin’s birth 500 years ago. Calvin has not 
only been very influential in theology, but also his social and economic thought has greatly 
influenced the economic development of Western society. This is illustrated by the well-
known thesis of Max Weber (1958), who argued that Calvinism has provided a spirit from 
which sober bourgeois capitalism with its rational organization of free labor originated. 
Although Weber’s thesis is drawn from the writings of later Calvinists (in particular English 
Puritans) rather than from Calvin’s own views,
1 Calvin’s writings on economy indeed provide 
a basis for legitimating capitalism. In contrast to Luther and other Reformers, who remained 
faithful to the medieval tradition of economics, he looked at the economy with the eyes of a 
businessman. He was not suspicious of  the capitalistic spirit of entrepreneurship and 
acknowledged the need for capital, credit and trade. Also providers of capital have a useful 
function in society. By relating the prohibition of interest in the Bible to the context of the 
economy of Old Israel, he provided a way to legitimize the role of money and interest in the 
economy of his days. Calvin’s position on lending at interest is therefore often considered a 
turning point in the economic history of the West (Tawney, 1964).
2
  However, Calvin did not accept capitalism unconditionally. Calvin perceived social-
economic behavior as a vital part of the Christian worship of God (McKee,  2007). He 
therefore maintained a normative framework for economic behavior that, on the one hand, 
allowed for free enterprise, but at the other hand limited excesses by regulations. In this 
article, I am particularly interested in the type of restrictions that Calvin proposed for the 
capital market. Western economies, and in particular the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism 
that dominates the economy in the US, have largely disregarded these restrictions. The 
question therefore arises whether capitalism can do without the type of restrictions that Calvin 
proposed. In order to research this question, I take the credit crisis as a case study. Because 
2009 is not only the year in which we commemorated Calvin’s birth 500 years ago, but also a 
year of worldwide economic recession following the credit crisis in 2008. The research 
question of this article is therefore: What can Calvin’s restrictions on the charging of interest 
learn us about the moral deficiencies that became apparent during the credit crisis? 
 
  The content of the article is as follows. First, I will give a short description of the 
economic context of Calvin’s days and summarize Calvin’s view on banking and interest as 
well as  Calvin’s  related  views  on richness and the duty to assist the poor.  After a short 
overview of the main actors and main causes of the credit crisis, section 3 will apply Calvin’s 
principles on interest to the current credit crisis and research in what sense these principles 
can help us understand what went wrong. Section 4 will conclude with implications for future 
policies of banks and governments that follow from Calvin’s restrictions based on the analysis 
in section 3. 
 
2  Calvin’s View on Interest 
 
Historical Background   2   
 
The sixteenth century witnessed  an unknown burst of economic energy as a result of the 
extension of trade and exploratory expeditions overseas. Because of the commercial growth, the 
financial system developed to provide finance for the growth in trade. New industries and the 
growth of international trade required new, specialized forms of finance. Some expeditions 
overseas were so expensive, that they could only be initiated if others were willing to co-finance 
the operations through stocks. As a result, money and stock markets came into existence and 
capitalism penetrated society. 
  The increase in trade and commerce, however, did not go together with a substantial rise 
in welfare, because a substantial part of the extra revenues was used for financing the many 
wars that divided Europe. These wars caused increasing food prices and great suffering, both in 
the cities and the rural areas. Also in Geneva, where Calvin was living and working, food was 
scarce, because of continuous conflicts with the duke of Savoy, who tried to isolate Geneva 
from the surrounding countryside. Since Geneva  provided refuge to many prosecuted 
Protestants from other parts of the country, the combination of low supply and high demand for 
food led to high food prices. In many sermons, Calvin refers to this situation of great scarcity in 
basic goods (Bieler 2005: 127). 
  The general economic situation and the social imbalance stimulated Calvin and his 
predecessor Farel to initiate social reforms, such as a general hospital and obligatory primary 
education. The general hospital provided free medical help to the poor who could not afford a 
doctor (Bieler 2005: 136). The public schools had to make sure that everybody had the same 
primary educational opportunities. Deacons had to take care that everybody lacking the basic 
subsistence means learned an occupation and they also assisted with looking for work 
opportunities. 
  Also the type of business that was present in Geneva during the stay of Calvin 
influenced Calvin’s view on the economy. Geneva was a commercial city at the crossroads of 
many trade routes. Traders were influential members of the Protestant community in Geneva. 
The openness to new developments and the taste of freedom that went together with trade have 








Along with the development of commerce, the need for opening credits as loans at interest 
increased. Any large scale industry needed capital and this provided a context for the rise of 
new financial practices in which some merchants specialized into bankers. The church had not 
ceased, however, to condemn interest. Also in Geneva, church regulations used to oppose 
interest, but the practice of lending at interest started to grow, already before the time of the 
Reformation. 
  Calvin was the first among Christian theologians who believed that charging interest for 
lending was legitimate from a moral and theological point of view. He rejected the thesis of 
Aristotle and the church fathers Ambrose and Chrysostom and the scholastics that money is 
fruitless (‘shutting up money in a box does not produce any yield’).
5 Instead, he stressed that the   3   
productivity of labor is greatly enhanced if it is combined with capital. With the investment 
loan, the debtor is able to obtain additional income. A trader can, for instance, gain a great 
amount of money with someone else’s money. Hence, it is fair that the lender is compensated. 
Rewarding the supplier of capital is therefore as natural and fair as paying rent for the use of 
land or a house.
6
  Calvin showed that the biblical prohibitions of charging interest were irrelevant in this 
respect. He did so by noting that the vetoes on interest in the classical biblical texts, such as Ex. 
22:25, Lev. 25:35-38 and Deut. 23:19-20 concerned loans to the poor. In most cases, the reason 
for lending was to provide the poor with means of subsistence in order to survive. These biblical 
passages can therefore not really be applied to the new financial realities in Calvin’s time, 
because  commercial and industrial lending in Calvin’s days  was  meant for financing 
investments of business enterprises rather than lending to the poor. Whereas consumer lending 
to the poor yields no extra production to  the debtor and therefore does not warrant 
compensation, the investment loan to companies allows the debtor more profit opportunities.  
  
  Thus, Calvin disregards the biblical prohibitions of charging interest. In his view, these 
laws are political laws that pertain to a political situation that is not existent anymore. If one 
uses the biblical prohibitions to charge interest for condemning interest in modern economy, 
one makes the Bible say something it does not say, because it is beyond what the Word of God 
conveys. Rather, the meaning of the political laws in the Old Testament is to show that justice 
should prevail and that we should show generosity to the needy. There is a crucial difference 
between charging interest in business relations and usury. That also explains why the Israelites 
were allowed to demand interest from foreigners. The texts prohibiting charging interest on 
loans to the poor call for beneficent help of the poor and for not abusing their situation out of 
self-interest. According to Calvin, a text like Luke 6:35 does not condemn interest altogether. 
Christ did not intend to regulate lending, but rather wanted to fight the natural tendency of 
human beings to be slow in helping others, because they are accustomed to look at profitable 
ways of investing their money. Lending unselfishly is one of the marks of Christian charity.  
   
Restrictions on Interest 
 
Calvin’s arguments in favor of charging interest demonstrate his understanding of economic 
facts as well as the freedom with which he interprets Scripture. Taking a stand on the legitimacy 
of interest should not be motivated by biblical legalism, but by the principle of fairness. But 
notwithstanding his positive attitude with respect to interest, Calvin developed several 
exceptions  to  and restrictions on  charging interest. Because he was aware that, although 
forbidding interest altogether would tie down conscience more rigorously than God did, 
allowing interest could easily give way to an unbridled license for usury and abuse. In Calvin’s 
view, interest is legitimate, but not always, not from all people and not at all levels. 
  First, Calvin maintains the biblical prohibition of charging interest to poor people. One 
should not make abuse of those who are in a situation of utter need through their poverty. A true 
believer will use his richness to support the poor. Generosity is a matter of justice: we act 
unjustly if we do not give others what charity demands. In God’s eyes, we should also be   4   
beneficent towards the needy, insofar as each can. Calvin bases this human solidarity on the 
mutual dependency between people. God created man as a community where people need each 
other. An individual needs others in order to be productive. The Golden Rule from Luke 6:31 
implies that one should help the needy, because if one were needy oneself, one would like to be 
treated in a similar way.
7
  Second, opportunities for lending money with interest should not block lending for free 
to the needy. The creditor should  not use the argument that free loans provide him  with 
opportunity costs because of the alternative of a more profitable investment. More generally, we 
should not bypass the duty to exercise charity to the poor, because we can make profitable use 
of our money by lending with interest. That means that we can only use our money for profit 
after we have fulfilled our duty to charity.   
 But if one lends to a rich and well-to-do person, who has an adequate 
income or wealth, the creditor should receive interest on his loan and should not be condemned.  
  Third, Calvin applies the Golden Rule in Luke 6:31 that we should treat others in the 
way we want to be treated ourselves. The principle of the Golden Rule is equality and 
reciprocity. This means that loans should not be subjected to conditions that we would not like 
to accept ourselves if we borrowed from others. Everyone should place himself before the 
divine Seat of Judgment and therefore do to their neighbors only what they like their neighbor 
to do to them. In this way, the Golden Rule will serve as an infallible injunction to proper self-
discipline, according to Calvin. 
  Fourth, the loan must enable the borrower to make a higher profit than without the loan. 
Thus, the extra yield from the use of capital should exceed its costs (interest).  If this does not 
happen, an interest-free loan must be agreed as a form of assistance. In his commentary on Ps. 
15:5, Calvin also makes a comment that those who lend at interest are not accomplishing any 
effort. Therefore, the creditors are not worthy of being rewarded to the same extent or more than 
those that work hard for it to pay the interest.  
  Furthermore, Calvin is aware that the influence of interest goes beyond the effects on the 
benefits and costs of the lender and borrower. It impacts the cost of living and therefore the 
interests of all consumers. Interest should be at the service of all generally. 
  Finally, Calvin believes that making a profession of lending money cannot be tolerated. 
In his commentary on Psalm 15, he states that one very rarely finds a lender who is not a thief. 
And in his commentary on Ezek. 18:7, Calvin states that whoever makes a profession of putting 
money out at usury, is a robber. Such a person will certainly commit injustice as if there is no 
law or mutual love. If a person erects a bank, he is a professional lender. It is unworthy to a 
Christian and honorable man. Only persons who do not regularly lend money for interest may 
well receive interest.
8
  Hence, Calvin does condemn excessive interest rates. A number of times, the consistory 
in Geneva punished businessmen for loans of money that had to be paid back with a substantial 
high interest rate (Kingdon, 2007). Calvin, however, does not provide an answer to the question 
what level of interest should be considered proper. As a standard for judging the reasonableness 
of interest, he again refers to the Golden Rule. Charging interest is legitimate if it is not harming 
the community and does not violate justice. Nevertheless, since Calvin was aware of the social 
harm of unlimited interest and the fact that men tend to sin in their economic dealings, he 
   5   
pleaded for government regulation of the interest rate. Het got the authorities in Geneva to 
maintain a lawful rate of interest at 5% (later 6 2/3 %), a relative low rate for that period (Bieler 
2005: 147). This barrier also intended to prevent the appearance of professional lenders, to 
whom Calvin, as we noted above, was rigidly opposed. 
 
Avarice and Opulence 
 
I will end this section with two other notions that characterize Calvin’s view on economy, 
namely his criticism on the search for richness and excessive consumption. Interest contributes 
to the income of the creditor. Lending money at excessive rates may indicate avarice. Calvin 
connects the search for richness to lack of faith in God. Also the apostle Paul equates avarice to 
idolatry. The fear of misfortune stimulates people to search for richness. But the more they 
have, the greedier they become. Just as it is the object of drunkards to drink not what may 
refresh them and meet their natural needs, but to glut themselves with wine, so it is if avarice is 
dominant in the heart of men. They are seized with a certain kind of fury, like a person who 
longs for wine without end and without measure.
9
  The alienation from God is not only expressed by avarice, but also by the vice of 
excessive luxury consumption. A true Christian should be temperate and modest and  devote his 
life to God. In his commentary on Amos 6:4, Calvin states that opulence should be condemned, 
because it always goes together with sinning. We must suppress excessive luxury material 
wants. The best attitude is to be satisfied with the necessary means of life. That does not mean 
that Calvin rejected enjoyment of consumption. God’s gifts in Creation, such as the color and 





Humans that despise earthly goods  alienate from themselves and rob themselves from all 
feelings. 
3.   Application to the Credit Crisis 
 
The previous section shows that Calvin was very well able to build bridges between biblical 
principles and the economy in his times. But do the principles and the restrictions that he 
developed still hold water for modern economy? In order to research this question, I will focus 
on the recent credit crisis. Do Calvin’s restrictions on interest provide relevant interpretations of 
what went wrong in the credit crisis?  
 
The Credit Crisis: Main Actors 
 
Before dealing with the question, I will first give a short sketch of the main causes of the 
credit crisis. Although the credit crisis is a complex phenomenon and still needs a lot of 
scientific research, we can identify some main actors that have contributed to the crisis. 
  First, governmental institutions have failed in three respects. First, the US government 
can be blamed for implicitly subsidizing the credit expansion in the US housing  market 
through the government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Risk managers 
working at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have sounded the alarm bells, but under political   6   
pressure,  senior management deliberately continued to buy large amounts of Alt-A and 
subprime loans. The reason was that they wanted to meet certain goals set by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (Calomiris, 2008). By shaping the market for mortgage 
loans, they have encouraged private investors to enter as well. When interest rates started to 
rise in 2004, many homeowners were unable to meet the obligations of the bank and 
consequently the home prices plummeted. 
  US policy makers also failed in monetary policy. To sustain economic growth, the 
Federal Reserve systematically lowered the price of money. The resulting excess liquidity was 
invested in housing, causing the housing bubble. 
  The third failure concerns the lack of good supervision and regulation of financial 
markets, both in the US and in other countries. This promoted lax underwriting standards to 
loan originators and failed to correct the market imperfections in the trade of financial 
products. Another major shortcoming in regulation concerns the lack of macro prudential 
supervision on multi-country level. Supervision in Europe as well as on the global level 
focused too much on individual firms, primarily on banks. Observation of significant risks did 
not result in appropriate action (De Larosière Group, 2009). Moreover, there were significant 
differences in the policies of supervisors. Due to severe competition with other countries, 
supervisors feared that tighter supervision would harm their national competitive position 
(Tabellini, 2008). A lot of national supervisors were not willing to openly discuss the fragility 
of their financial institutions.  
  The second major group of players concerns the commercial banks that sold 
mortgages to subprime borrowers. They thereby ignored checking the credit history, income 
and other relevant parameters of borrowers. This behavior was triggered by the fact that these 
subprime loans were sold in the secondary loan market within a year after origination. The 
credit risk was thus passed on to the buyers of these secured mortgages (Mian and Sufi, 
2008). 
  The third major group that has contributed to the credit crisis consists of investment 
banks that have transformed the mortgages into mortgage backed securities and collateralized 
debt obligations. As such, these new innovative instruments to share risk can be beneficial. 
On the other hand, because of the complexity of these financial products, they also create 
more opportunities for asymmetric information that is used to hide risks at the detriment of 
the buyers of these products. 
  This leads us to the fourth major actor, the credit rating agencies. Competition 
between rating agencies through rating shopping resulted in rating inflation. Empirical 
evidence suggests that the more complex the security, the higher the rating bias produced by 
rating agencies (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009). 
  The fifth type of player concerns  the buyers of derivatives. They failed to use 
appropriate risk models and took too much risk in their portfolios  (Bervas, 2006). Their 
appetite for risk was encouraged by excessive bonus systems for investment managers that 
stimulated a short-term focus on profitability. 
  Finally, one can say that the strong focus on short-term profitability was also induced 
by the short-time horizon of shareholders of banks. The average holding period for stocks   7   
until the mid-1960s was about seven years. Today it is less than a year in professionally 
managed funds (Rappaport, 2005). Aggressive shareholders like hedge funds prompted  banks 
to a short-term focus on maximizing stock value. 
 
First Restriction: Do Not Charge Interest to the Poor 
 
What can Calvin’s restrictions on charging interest learn us about the credit crisis? When 
considering Calvin’s first restriction that one should not charge interest to the poor, the 
linkage with the credit crisis is that the subprime mortgages mostly concerned relatively poor 
persons. Calvin’s guideline demands free loans to the poor. One can indeed question whether 
subprime mortgages are apt to provide finance for housing of people with low purchasing 
power, because of the risk that interest rates may rise and house prices will not continue to rise. 
Although the goal of enabling poor people to own their own house is socially desirable, one can 
doubt whether market products can effectively be used to attain this goal.  
  Recent experience with the so-called Bottom of the Pyramid approach seems to suggest 
that this is indeed possible (Prahalad, 2006). The core idea of the Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) 
approach is that large companies develop new commercial products that are targeted at the 
needs of the poor and contribute to the fight against poverty. The approach is market based 
and does not depend on government assistance, since it is believed that companies can make a 
profit by serving the mass of poor people. According to Prahalad, poverty reduction can result 
from co-creating a market around the needs of the poor. In this view, innovation in financial 
services (like microfinance) is much more effective in reducing poverty than development 
assistance.  Innovation thus provides the basis for a profitable win-win engagement of 
companies in solving social problems. Treating the poor as normal consumers, according to 
this view, does not only provide them with products and services at a reasonable price, but 
also provides respect, fair treatment and self-esteem.  
  In a way, offering mortgages to low income groups is an application of this idea. 
Financial companies offering subprime  mortgages  to poor families made a nice profit, 
whereas many poor families got access to the financial means they needed for  buying 
themselves a house. Furthermore, innovation in financial products allowed the sharing of the 
risks involved with these subprime mortgages to be re-allocated to other financial parties all 
over the world. However, this kind of win-win opportunities did not prove to be sustainable, 
because in the end, market products can only be sold to customers with appropriate purchasing 
power market. The fact that initially the market strategy seemed to succeed was only due to 
market  imperfections  that  hindered a transparent transmission of information of the risks 
involved with the mortgages as well as to temporarily favorable market developments that 
reduced interest rates on mortgages while raising the price of houses. But when interest rates 
increased, many poor families were confronted with an interest burden that was too high and 
with housing market prices that were plummeting, thereby demolishing the profits that the 
win-win strategies promised. In the case of the housing market in the US, market instruments 
therefore proved to be incapable to solve the social problem of providing poor families with 
housing. In the end, the new financial tools turned out to do great harm to the overall economy   8   
and the housing market in the US particularly. 
  Therefore, it seems that Calvin’s restriction not to charge interest from the poor is still 
relevant in modern economy. There are two ways to apply this restriction in current economic 
reality. One way is that investors take up ways of social responsibility that do not necessarily 
serve profit maximization. For example, by willingly investing in funds that are targeted at 
social goals, such as micro credit funds, but that yield less profit than commercial lending. A 
second way of applying this restriction results from Calvin’s plea for public hospitals and public 
schools. In that case, one acknowledges that meeting the housing needs of the poor on a large 
scale cannot be attained without some kind of government assistance. In the case of housing 
policy, subsidies or other types of government assistance and state assurances could help people 
with low purchasing power to earn a living of their own. An interesting application is the 
proposal of Martin Feldstein to restructure the subprime mortgages by offering homeowners the 
opportunity to replace 20% of the mortgage with a loan from the government for an 
amortization period of 30 years at an interest rate of only 2%, subject to a maximum of $ 80.000 
(Ferguson, 2009). If this kind of measures was put in place before the credit crisis started, it 
could have rescued many poor homeowners from forced sale of their house and have prevented 
the massive decline in the housing market that we have witnessed during the credit crisis.  
 
Second Restriction: Do Not Neglect Your Duty to Charity 
 
The second restriction holds that business  investments should not crowd out charity.  This 
restriction is very much related to the first restriction. Demanding no (or less) interest from poor 
people than from other people in order to help them achieve a living income is a way of charity 
as understood by Calvin. The principle therefore calls investors to continue also their socially 
responsible investments even if there are currently in a market with rising stock values 
opportunities for more profitable investments. According to Calvin, a person who exploits some 
money that he should have allotted to help someone is degrading himself to the rank of a usurer 
(Bieler, 2005).  
  Also for companies, it is very tempting to reduce the support to social projects now 
profits have vanished and the continuity of the company is at stake. Many companies are 
following a strategy of cost reduction in order to secure the continuity of the company. There is 
a strong focus on cutting all costs that do not serve the core business of the company. Charity is 
clearly one of the easy targets. However, in Calvin’s view, a businessman should always 
consider the deeper meaning of doing business, which is to serve God and his fellow human 
beings.  Therefore, budgets aiming at supporting the needy  should have high priority and 
although severe market circumstances may force companies to temporarily reduce these 
budgets, they may only do so with the intention that continuing their business will also enable 
them to take responsibility for the needy once again.  
  This is particularly relevant for charity to funds directed to poverty reduction in 
developing countries. This also holds for governments who are facing the challenge  of 
stimulating their own economy while trying to prevent government debt from souring. In this 
situation,  it might be very tempting to reduce the support to developing countries. In the   9   
Netherlands, for example, all public expenditures are maintained in order to stimulate the 
economy except one category, namely development aid. This is the result of a budget rule that 
links development aid directly to national income (which has declined by about 5%). However, 
the credit crisis particularly hits the developing countries. According to the World Bank (2009), 
the financial situation in developing countries is rapidly worsening due to a substantial decline 
in their  export and in foreign investments. Also revenues from migrants working in other 
countries are plummeting, because of rising unemployment in the US, Europe and Asia. This 
particularly hits migrants, because they are dismissed first before the incumbent employees lose 
their job. Since the economic recession in developing countries poses a much more serious 
threat to meeting basic human needs than the recession in developed countries,  governments 
should give high priority to maintaining their support to  developing countries. 
 
Third Restriction: Respect Reciprocity 
 
Also respect of reciprocity as reflected by the Golden Rule – Calvin’s third restriction - has 
relevant implications for the credit crisis, because banks have neglected this principle in several 
stakeholder relations. 
  First, lack of reciprocity is shown by the commercial banks that sold mortgages to 
subprime borrowers  and  pooled them in collateralized loan obligations to be sold to 
institutional investors in the secondary loan market. By disregarding underwriting standards 
like, for instance a 20% down payment, a check of credit history or height of salary, they 
harmed the interests of those to whom the mortgages were eventually sold. Furthermore, in 
the process of repackaging mortgage loans through securitization, information on risks was 
deliberately hidden and consequently investors were not sufficiently aware of the probability 
of default. It is obvious that this way of dealing with trading partners violates the principle of 
reciprocity. If these banks themselves invest in financial assets, they also want to be well 
informed about the risks involved with the assets. The Golden Rule then demands that one 
should deal in a similar way with one’s trading partners.  
  A similar criticism holds for credit agencies. By deliberately providing too high 
ratings to attract as much customers as possible, they did not respect the autonomy of their 
investors. If they sat in the seat of these investors who trusted the judgment of rating agencies 
when buying these complex derivatives, they themselves  would also have wanted fair 
judgments, particular because that is exactly what the job of rating agencies is about. From an 
impartial point of view, professionals should act in accordance with the professional standards 
for the task that they are assigned to in order to secure a good operation of the market. 
  A third example of lack of reciprocity concerns the relationship between banks and 
depositors. If the asset managers invest in the complex financial products without understanding 
the risk profile of these products, they play with other people’s money. This violates the 
principle of reciprocity. If they had placed themselves in the shoes of depositors that trusted 
their money to the bank, they would also have preferred a less risky investment policy. This also 
applies to institutional investors like pension funds to which employees trusted their pensions.  
  Also in the relationship with creditors, banks have transgressed the principle of   10   
reciprocity. When banks provide credit to companies, they normally demand guarantees in 
terms of minimum solvability and liquidity rates. The credit crisis has made apparent, however, 
that the solvability of banks itself was extremely low (in some cases even lower than 5%), just 
in order to increase leverage and therefore the profitability on their own equity. Because of this 
small buffer, banks got into severe liquidity problems once the interbank lending collapsed as a 
result of increasing distrust among banks. As a result, banks were not able anymore to provide 
their clients with credit and this caused a major impediment to investments by the business 
sector. Again, if banks had looked at themselves through the eyes of their clients, they would 
also have wanted higher rates of solvability and liquidity in order to be able to continue their 
function as financial mediators. 
  A fifth example of lack of reciprocity is the high bonuses received by asset managers. 
Reciprocity demands that a bonus reflects the value added of asset managers for the company, 
its stakeholders and for society at large. During the credit crisis, the value added to the (short-
term) investment policies of these asset managers has been negative in a devastating degree. 
Even so, many managers continued to claim a bonus. Only after strong social pressure, some of 
them (like managers of AIG) moderated their claims. Also the high level of the bonuses that 
asset managers receive seems to indicate that they have lost contact with reality. If they looked 
at their own position from the perspective of shareholders (who faced a decline in stock values 
of more than 50%), they would realize that such high bonuses are unfair, because the only loss 
that these managers face when failing in the way they did, is the loss of a bonus and not the loss 
of a major part of their financial wealth.  
  Taking this point to a more general level, bank managers seem also not aware of the lack 
of reciprocity exhibited by the shifting of harm caused by the credit crisis to society at large. 
Because of the Keynesian policies of many governments to fight the recession caused by the 
credit crisis, government debt is surging and this generates a high burden for the future to be 
paid by all citizens. But this being the case, even now it seems that asset managers continue to 
act as they did before the crisis. 
  From all these examples one can conclude that when market parties in the financial 
sector develop a narrow focus on short-term profits or self interests, they tend to treat their 
stakeholders merely as instruments for maximizing their own financial rewards. This results in a 
lack of respect of stakeholders and a breach of the principle of reciprocity. Because if they 
placed themselves in the position of the stakeholders (shareholders, depositors, other clients and 
society at large), they would probably also not have wanted to be treated merely as means for 
the greed of bank managers.   
 
Fourth Restriction: Let the Borrower Make As Much Or More Profit from the Borrowed Money 
   
The fourth restriction of Calvin cannot be guaranteed in every case, because that would require 
that the creditor fully partakes in the risks of the debtor (as in some forms of Islamic banking).  
But on a macro level, neoclassical theory predicts that in the long run, the free market operation 
on the capital market will secure the condition to be fulfilled, since interest rates adapt to the 
demand and supply of credit. For an investment project to be profitable, its return (the revenue   11   
from increased future production of goods and services) must exceed its costs (the payment for 
borrowed funds). If the  interest rate rises, fewer investment projects are profitable and the 
quantity of investment goods falls. If the market for loans is in equilibrium, the interest rate 
equals the investment return of the investment project that is least profitable of all investment 
projects that are financed by loans. Therefore, according to neoclassical theory, the return on 
investments will normally exceed the costs of interest payment and therefore Calvin’s fourth 
restriction will in most cases hold in the longer run.  
  Still, one can doubt whether this neoclassical argument also convinces in the case of the 
credit crisis. From the literature on bounded rationality we know that individuals may not be as 
rational as is assumed by neo-classical theory (Conlisk, 1996; Rabin, 1998). People often lack 
the cognitive ability to form  rational expectations, particularly in choice sets that require 
intertemporal trade-offs (like in the case of mortgages). This may particularly be true for low 
income groups. Because these groups have limited capacity to oversee the consequences of 
buying a house, banks have a duty to take special care to ensure that the house owners’ interests 
are not harmed (Velasquez, 1998). It is often only the bank who can fairly be said to know and 
understand when a mortgage is a suitable product that house owners can afford. But mortgage 
banks did not take up this responsibility and did not screen house owners with respect to their 
ability to finance their mortgage in case of changing market conditions. At the contrary, 
motivated by short-term profits, they tried to sell as much as possible mortgages at conditions 
that are favorable in the short run (i.e. short-term interest rates and rising housing prices). As 
long as these favorable short-term conditions were fulfilled, Calvin’s fourth condition was met 
since the subprime mortgages allowed debtors to benefit from the value increase in houses. But 
this situation proved to be unsustainable. When interest rates started to rise, house owners found 
that they were not capable anymore to pay the interest burden and were forced to give up their 
house. As a result, house  prices went down  and so  the benefits  of homeowners became 
negative.  
  Still, this is not the full story. Because a peculiar aspect of the mortgage market in the 
US is that house owners can fairly easily get rid of their mortgage, simply by handing the key 
over into the hands of the mortgage bank. Consequently, house owners who were forced to sell 
their house did not incur a substantial wealth loss as a result of a decline in the price of their 
house. All risks involved with falling house prices were shifted to the owners of the derivatives 
of mortgages. Hence, the final harm to the wealth of house owners remained rather limited in 
comparison to the financial harm to investors that invested in the mortgage based derivatives. In 
a way, therefore, the fourth condition of Calvin was still met: the losses of the borrowers (house 
owners) were lower than the losses of the lenders (investors in derivatives). 
 
Fifth Condition: Also Consider What Is Expedient for the Public at Large 
 
It is not difficult to see the relevance of the fifth condition that one should take into account the 
indirect effects of interest on society at large. This condition anticipates the current theme of 
corporate social responsibility. According to the Social Economic Council (2001), CSR 
incorporates two elements:   12   
1  Sufficient focus by the enterprise on its contribution to public prosperity in the longer 
run 
2  The relationship with its stakeholders and society at large 
Both elements fit the essence of this fifth condition of Calvin, namely that lenders should take 
into account the wider welfare effects of their dealings on society at large. CSR means that 
business should create value in three societal dimensions, namely: economic (through the 
production of goods and services and through the creation of employment and sources of 
income); social (a variety of aspects concerning the effects for human beings, inside and 
outside the organization, like good labor relations, safety etc.); and ecological (the effects on 
the natural environment). According to the EU (2006), banks have increasingly taken steps to 
integrate social and ecological values in their policies and  developed instruments to 
communicate their CSR performance to its stakeholders by social reporting. But the credit 
crisis shows that many of them have neglected their core economic responsibilities. As a 
result of the excessive risks in investment policies and the resulting collapse in trust among 
banks, the intermediary function of financial institutions halted  and some banks went 
bankrupt. Moreover, as particularly large banks had reached beyond their traditional activities 
and included other services (insurance, private banking) in recent years, these banks became 
more homogeneous and so did their risk profile. As a result of this rapid diversification, the 
stability of the banking sector deteriorated, creating substantial systemic risks to the banking 
sector as a whole (Wagner, 2008). 
  This has had an enormous impact on the interests of various stakeholders and on society 
at large. First, shareholders saw the value of their stocks in financials plummet. According to 
Alan Greenspan, self-interest on the free market failed to stimulate banks to an investment 
policy that serves shareholders interests. Literally he said: “I made a mistake in presuming that 
the self-interests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best 
capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in firms.” (NRC, 10/30/2008, p. 
7). But CSR goes well beyond the protection of shareholder interests and also includes the 
interests of other stakeholders, such as clients of banks, employees and society at large. Among 
the clients that were severely harmed are companies who were confronted with a drastic 
reduction in credit facilities, causing major liquidity problems. Furthermore, deposit holders 
were facing high risks because of the danger of bankruptcy of banks. It is only due to intensive 




many banks fired employees in order to reduce costs, thereby severely harming the interests of 
their employees. Finally, as the crisis unfolded to other sectors, firms in other sectors were 
confronted with a dramatic fall in the demand of goods and services, which resulted in the 
layoffs  of many employees as well. Government budget deficits surged, creating a high burden 
on future tax payers, whereas pension schemes faced a huge decline in covering rates, forcing 
pension funds to raise pension premiums or to reduce pension benefits.  
Sixth Condition: Do Not Make a Full Profession of Your Banking 
 
Finally, although Calvin’s opposition to professional bankers seems outdated in modern   13   
economy, his warning for the moral dangers of professional banking also holds water in the 
current crisis. In particular, one of the causes of the appetite for risk in the investment behavior 
of banks is the strong focus on short-term gains in wealth. Here Calvin’s analysis of avarice is 
particularly telling, because the exorbitant bonuses seem to have obscured the bank investors’ 
ability of sound risk judgment.  There is empirical evidence that a long-time horizon 
contributes to long-term profitability (Richardson and Waegelein, 2002; Keil et al, 2001). But 
companies are either unwilling or unable to make investments that are necessary for the 
future, but that require a sacrifice of short-term profits. A very often mentioned reason for this 
is pressure from the stock market (Segelod, 2000). Also compensation of executives not based 
on the long-term performance of the company will ultimately  lead to decisions that are 
detrimental to shareholder wealth (Vogel and Lobo, 2002).  
  Furthermore, the literature on intrinsic motivation provides considerable empirical 
evidence that price incentives crowd out generosity (Frey and Jegen, 2001). The undermining 
effect is maintained, even if the monetary incentive is stopped (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). 
Paying excessive bonuses may therefore have crowded out intrinsic professional values that 
are traditionally considered of utmost importance for the banking sector, such as reliability, 
justice, accountability and servitude to clients. As stated by the Advisory Committee Future 
Banks (2009: 7): ‘The credit crisis has cast doubt on the ethical and moral attitudes and 
behaviors of bankers. This has been encouraged by the high variable rewards (bonuses) that 
were received (and still are received) by bankers’ (Advisory Committee Future Banks, 2009).   
  Calvin’s suspicion that making money with money may be detriment to virtues that are 
needed in banking should therefore still be taken seriously. Although the need for a change in 
business culture is widely acknowledged, the signs of an emerging new culture in the financial 
sector are not unambiguously positive. As noticed above, banking managers are still inclined to 
continue the bonus systems that used to apply in the pre-crisis period. The societal protests and 
the apparent lack of justice of these reward systems does not seem to bother them. This once 
again illustrates Calvin’s point that working with money may make people insensitive to moral 
claims. I can think of three reasons why this culture is highly persistent. First, as capitalism 
legitimizes well-understood interests, bankers may reason that others would also not refuse high 
rewards if their company offered these to them. A second reason is habit formation. Many 
economic researches show that people get used to high levels of rewards (Clark, 1999). A third 
reason is social interaction in peer groups. There is a lot of research that shows that the 
satisfaction derived from income depends on its relative level (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; 
Brekke and Howarth, 2002). The satisfaction that bank managers get from their reward is 
therefore also probably related to their relative bonus in comparison to the bonus of other 
bank managers. A bank manager will relate the reasonableness of his reward to the reward of 
his colleagues. He or she is therefore not sensitive to claims of people working in other sectors 
of economy saying that rewards of bankers as a group are not in proportion to the value added 
they create to society. This blocks self-criticism derived from the spectatorship as described by 
Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiment.  
 
Temperance   14   
 
Modesty and temperance are not only relevant virtues for bankers, but apply to other people as 
well. A final application of Calvin’s social and economic thought to the credit crisis that I 
therefore want to mention is the virtue of temperance. The credit crisis has been so influential 
partly because of the vulnerable financial situation in the US. Both on the micro and the 
government level, debt has substantially increased. Total private and public debt rose from 155 
% of GDP in the early eighties to 342 % of GDP in mid 2008 (Ferguson, 2009). Taking into 
account that the US is one of the richest countries, this indicates that the American lifestyle is 
extremely materialistic and can be characterized as overconsumption.  According to Moore 
(2005), this tendency to excessive consumption is an inherent part of the current Anglo-
American version of capitalism. Because of this huge debt, the buffer capacity for absorbing 
the reduction in wealth caused by the decline in housing market prices has been very small. This 
has crowded out the market’s trust in government policy and is one of the reasons why the 
credit crisis has hit so hard as it has done till now.  
 
4.   Lessons For Future Policies 
 
In the previous section, we found that all restrictions on the practice of banking that Calvin 
proposed  yield  insight into various moral problems that became apparent during the credit 
crisis. In this final section, we will shortly indicate some lessons that banks and governments 
can learn from these restrictions in fighting the crisis or preventing it from reoccurring in the 




The main lesson that banks can learn from the restrictions that Calvin proposed is that they 
should not only focus on serving their own  interests  and those of short-term oriented 
stockholders, but also consider the interests of other stakeholders like trading partners, clients, 
deposit holders, employees and  society at large. If banks reciprocate the value added that these 
stakeholders provide to the banks, chances that trust will break down and banks get into a crisis 
will substantially decline. In this way, banks will not only meet the third and fifth restriction 
discussed in section 3, but also show that Calvin’s sixth restriction may be too stringent by 
proving that full time banking does not corrupt the bankers’ morality.  
  This shift requires that banks reduce the degree of risk taking. This can be done in 
several ways, such as a reduction in leverage (an increase in solvability), a more  careful 
investment policy (based on a thorough understanding of the risks of the investment assets) and 
a return to the core business that matches the bank’s expertise. Only activities that provide clear 
synergies should be taken up in order to maintain sufficient control.  
  The reorientation from narrow short-term self-interest towards stakeholder interests also 
demands innovations in the governance of the bank at various levels (Advisory Committee 
Future Banks, 2009). The board of supervisory directors should be aware and committed to the 
societal role of banks in order to judge the bank’s operations from a broader view that balances   15   
the interests of various stakeholders. This requires that the boards of supervisory directors are 
sufficiently qualified to be able to independently judge the risks of their banking policies. The 
risk policy of the bank should regularly be explicitly discussed by the board of supervisory 
directors.  
  Similar  implications  apply  to the board of managing directors. Banks could, for 
example, introduce declarations to be signed by managing directors and relevant employees of 
these banks that demand commitment to a responsible stakeholder policy. In balancing the 
interests of shareholders, clients, depositors, employees and society at large, the board of 
managing directors should give priority to the interests of clients and depositors. If these 
interests are secure, banks will more effectively serve society. And chances are high that the 
bank will then also be financially successful and be able to meet its responsibility towards its 
shareholders. The resulting financial stability will also enable  banks  to meet their social 
responsibility to disadvantaged groups, thereby meeting Calvin’s first and second restrictions 
concerning charity to the poor.  
  The board of supervisory directors and the board of managing directors should also take 
up the responsibility to moderate the bonuses of bank managers. Particularly CEO’s could have 
an important influence on the business culture by setting an example by showing temperance 
with regard to their own income. Furthermore, total income of bank managers (i.e. base salary, 
bonus, stock options and exit rewards) should be proportional to the value added of the banks in 
the long run and should be reasonable when compared to the income of other bank employees 
and employees in other sectors of economy. The income of bank managers should not depend 
merely on financial parameters, but also include non-financial parameters relating to client 
satisfaction, integrity, compliance to legal provisions and sustainability.  
  Finally, by pursuing a long-term strategy of profit maximization, banks will also be able 
to attract shareholders with a long-term horizon. The commitment of shareholders towards a 
long-term horizon can be further enhanced by rewarding stable stockholders with a loyalty 




Although Calvin put considerable stress on the social responsibility of businessmen, he also 
called for state intervention if people do not live up to their duties. Improvidence, greed or lack 
of self-restraint threaten the wealth of others. Since these sins corrupt social relations, the state 
is entrusted the responsibility to establish rules that safeguard that economic agents do not harm 
each other and that honesty and modesty be preserved among them. An example is Calvin’s 
support of the regulation of the interest rate in Geneva. 
  In light of the restrictions that Calvin proposed on capital market transactions and given 
the problems that became apparent during the credit crisis, government regulation is also 
warranted in the current economic context, although of a different kind that Calvin proposed. 
First, there are several measures governments could take that are complementary to the policy 
changes by banks discussed above. For example, legal provisions could be established that 
guarantee the supervisory directors’ ability (such as obligatory tests of expertise and experience   16   
and, if necessary, further training of existing directors). Furthermore, in order to raise 
solvability, governments  can raise minimum solvability requirements for banks (putting a 
maximum to their leverage ratio) and demand that risky assets remain on their balance sheet. 
Furthermore, if banks are not willing to take up responsibility for moderating the bonuses of 
bank managers, governments should internationally cooperate in order to put effective 
restrictions on the level of such bonuses. Obviously, this kind of price ceilings are not first best 
options (as a maximum interest rate that Calvin proposed is neither), but in order to prevent the 
social harm that exorbitant bonuses produce (restriction 5) as well as to do justice to the 
principle of reciprocity (restriction 3), governments cannot remain inactive if banks are reluctant 
to take the necessary steps. 
  Furthermore, governments should learn from the mistakes in the regulation policies of 
the US government and other governments. Housing market regulation should protect house 
owners against bounded rationality. In case of low income groups, governments  should 
carefully select measures that provide assistance in a more sustainable way and not be too 
optimistic that market solutions alone will be sufficient to solve poverty. Policy makers should 
therefore be prepared to support initiatives by collective expenditures (restriction 1).  
  Also the regulation of the financial sector should be improved to prevent negative 
externalities of banking on other sectors of economy (restriction 5). Various national and 
multinational committees have done proposals in this regard (Eijffinger, 2009). For example, 
for improving supervision at the European level, De Larosière Group (2009) proposed the 
founding of a European Systemic Risk Council with the task to pool and analyze all risks that 
might impact financial stability. An effective early warning system should be imposed, so that 
if turmoil in financial markets threatens, actions will be taken. On top of that, De Larosière 
Group proposed a new body for supervision at the micro level, the so-called European System 
of Financial Supervision, that would be responsible for the supervision of banks, insurance 
companies and stock markets at the national level. It is, however, beyond the scope of this 
article to discuss the detailed measures that should be taken in this field.  
  Furthermore, the credit crisis has confirmed Keynes’ view that there is a potential large 
role for the government to stabilize the economy. Many governments have indeed pursued an 
expansionary policy and probably rightly so. Such policies do not only stimulate their own 
economy, but also have a positive indirect influence on the economies in developing countries. 
But one wonders how expansionary policy that aims at growth relates to Calvin’s plea for 
modesty. As a minimum, temperance implies that policies should also be anti-cyclical when 
the economy starts growing again. This implies that particularly US government should take 
care to reduce government deficits as soon as the signs of recovering are strong enough. 
Furthermore, the principle of temperance also implies that governments reduce policies that 
stimulate high leverage financing by other market parties. In the case of the Netherlands, an 
example is the deductibility of mortgage interest, which provides households with a strong 
incentive to accept a maximum of debt to finance their houses. 
   Finally, stabilizing the government budget is also important in regard to Calvin’s second 
restriction that one should not neglect the needs of the poor, even if one can make a high return 
on investment. If governments run into severe deficits, it is more difficult to maintain their   17   
commitment to supporting the needy. 
  
Balancing Private and Public Responsibilities 
 
Obviously, regulation may not overrule the own responsibility of banks, but must rather aim 
to enforce it. It is beyond the power of governments to ensure that banks succeed in properly 
balancing the interests of all stakeholders involved. Nevertheless, as already stressed by 
Aristotle, good laws and regulation can substantially contribute to enforce virtuous patterns of 
behavior (Graafland, 2009).  According to Aristotle, virtues  arise as a result of habit: we 
become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing 
brave actions. Hence, we must display the right activities, because differences in these imply 
corresponding differences in the qualities of character. Although obeying the law may be 
initially motivated by extrinsic gains (such as the prevention of fines), extrinsic motives may 
slowly crowd in and become internalized in the attitudes of individuals when they get used to 
the actions that the law demands. Thus, when, for example, rating agencies are under a stricter 
control system that demands sound ratings and start to behave accordingly, this will change 
the professional standards in their companies and this will, in the end, also affect their 
business culture. Although the motive may initially be extrinsic – to maintain their license – 
the behavioral pattern will crowd in into the genes of the organization and its members and 
foster a good will to perform honestly and this will foster trust in the market. 
  On the other hand, overregulation may also crowd out the responsibility of banks. 
Instead of increasing regulation, the focus should therefore be on making regulation more 
effective without making it more burdensome, for example by shifting its focus from a 
national to an international level. Too much regulation will not only prove rather costly to 
society, but, from a moral point of view, also runs the risk of lack of respect of the freedom of 
private firms. Leaving too little responsibility may be detrimental to the development of 
intrinsic motivations of banks to honesty, temperance and prudence. One must allow financial 
companies to learn from the crisis. We all are aware now that banks can go bankrupt and this 
will have a decisive impact on the collective memory for the next decade. I therefore expect 
that banks will adjust their balances voluntarily and this may prove to be much more 
important that government regulation. Governments should not frustrate this process by too 




There are currently  various trends that confirm that  the banking sector and governments 
develop policies that are in line with the lessons that we can learn from Calvin’s restrictions 
on interest, as discussed above. Banks divest activities that do not belong to their core 
business. Many companies are raising their solvability and reduce the risk profile of their 
investment policies. Some CEO’s have taken the lead by willingly reducing their salary and 
abstaining from a bonus as long as their company is not profitable. 
   At the same time, governments are seriously considering policies that enforce these   18   
changes and have reconsidered the importance of government regulation as a way of dealing 
with inefficient and sinful structures in the private sector. All of these seem to confirm that 
Calvin was a  theologian who deserves not only to be commemorated  for  his work in 
theological dogma, but also for his ability to translate principles of Christian ethics to daily 




Advisory Committee Future Banks  (Adviescommissie Toekomst Banken):  2009, ‘Naar 
herstel van vertrouwen’, http://www.nvb.nl/scrivo/asset.php?id=290349. 
Bervas, A.: 2006, ‘Market liquidity and its incorporation into risk management’, Financial 
Stability Review, 8, Banque de France, May. 
Bieler, A.:  2005,  Calvin’s economic and social thought  (World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches/World Council of Churches, Genève). 
Brekke, K.A. and R.B. Howarth:  2002,  Status, Growth and the Environment; Goods as 
Symbols in Applied Welfare Economics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham). 
Calomiris, C. W.:  2008, ‘The Subprime Turmoil; What’s Old, What’s New, and What’s 
Next?’,  American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
http://www.aei.org/paper/28720 
Clark, A.E.:  1999,  ‘Are wages habit-forming? Evidence from micro data’, Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 39, 179-200. 
Conlisk, J.: 1996, ‘Why bounded rationality?’, Journal of Economic Literature 36, 669-700. 
De Larosière Group: 2009, The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, report, 
February. 
Eijffinger, S.C.W.: 2009, ‘What role for the ECB on financial market supervision?, 
http://feweb.uvt.nl/pdf/news__maart_2009_3.pdf 
European Union: 2006, ‘CSR in European Banking Sector: Evidence from a sector survey’, 
www.rare-eu.net 
Ferguson, N.:  2009,  ‘The age of obligation’,  http://www.niallferguson.com/site/ 
FERG/Templates/ArticleItem.aspx?pageid=200, accessed March 2009 
Frey, B.S. and R. Jegen: 2001, ‘Motivation crowding theory’, Journal of Economic Surveys 
15, 589-611. 
Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini: 2000, ‘Pay enough, or don’t pay at all’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115, 791-810. 
Graafland, J.J.: 2009, Do markets crowd out virtues? An Aristotelian framework, Journal of 
Business Ethics, DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0072-6. 
Keil, S. K., D. Reibstein and D.R. Wittink: 2001, ‘The impact of business objectives and the 
time horizon of performance evaluation on pricing behavior’, International Journal of 
Research in Marketing 18, 67-81. 
Kingdon, R.M.: 2007, ‘Calvin and church discipline’, In E. Dommon and J.D. Bratt (eds.), John 
Calvin Rediscovered: the impact of his social and economic thought (Westminster John   19   
Knox Press, Louisville/London). 
McKee, E.A.: 2007, ‘The character and significance of John Calvin’s teaching on social and 
economic issues’, In E. Dommon and J.D. Bratt (eds.), John Calvin Rediscovered: the 
impact of his social and economic thought  (Westminster John Knox Press, 
Louisville/London). 
Mian, A. and Sufi A.: 2008, ‘The consequences of mortgage credit expansion: evidence from 
the 2007 mortgage default crisis’, NBER Working Paper no. 13936. 
Moore, G.: 2005, ‘Humanizing Business: A modern virtue ethics approach’, Business Ethics 
Quarterly 15, 237-55. 
Prahalad, C.K.: 2006, The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid. Eradicating poverty through 
profits (Wharton School Publishing, Upper Saddle River). 
Rabin, M.: 1998, ‘Psychology and economics’, Journal of Economic Literature 46, 11-46. 
Rappaport, A.:  2005,  ‘The economics of short-term performance obsession’,  Financial 
Analyst Journal 61, 65-79. 
Richardson, Vernon J. and James F. Waegelein: 2002, ‘The Influence of Long-Term 
Performance Plans on Earnings Management and Firm Performance’, Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting 18, 161-183. 
Segelod, Esbjörn: 2000, ‘A comparison of managers’ perceptions of short-termism in Sweden 
and the US’, International Journal of Production Economics 63, 243-254. 
Skreta, V. en L. Veldkamp: 2009, ‘Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of 
Ratings Inflation, NBER working paper no. 14761. 
Smith, Adam: 1759, The theory of moral sentiments (Prometheus Books, New York). 
Social Economic Council: 2001, Corporate social responsibility: a Dutch approach (Van 
Gorcum, Assen). 
Solnick, S.J. and D. Hemenway: 1998, ‘Is more always better? A survey on positional 
concerns’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 37, 373-83. 
Stückelberger C.: 2007, ‘Calvin, Calvinism and Capitalism: the challenges of new interest in 
Asia’, In E. Dommon and J.D. Bratt (eds.), John Calvin Rediscovered: the impact of his 
social and economic thought (Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville/London). 
Stulz, R.M. and R. Williamson: 2003, ‘Culture, openness and finance, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70, 313-49. 
Tabellini, G.:  2008,  ‘Why did Bank Supervision fail?’,  VOX, 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/994, assessed September 2009 
Tawney, R.H.: 1964, Religion and the rise of capitalism (SUN, Nijmegen). 
Velasquez, M.G.:  1998,  Business ethics. Concepts and cases  (Upper Saddle River N.J.: 
Prentice Hall). 
Vogel, Th. J. and G.J. Lobo: 2002, Impact of adoption of long-term performance plans on 
financial analysts’ long-term forecasts, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
19, 291-306.   20   
Wagner, W.: 2008, ‘The homogenization of the financial system and financial crises’, Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, 17, 330-356. 
Weber, M.: 1958, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Scribner, New York). 
World Bank: 2009, ‘Swimming against the tide: How developing countries are coping with the 
global crisis’,  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/ 
swimmingagainstthetide-march2009.pdf, accessed March 2009. 
                                                            
1 See, for example, Tawney’s foreword in Weber’s book. Weber himself was also aware that his thesis relates to 
later Calvinist thought rather than to Calvin’s own social economic views. 
2 Even nowadays, Calvin’s acceptance of interest seems to have an influence with respect to creditor rights. Stulz 
and Williamson (2003), for example, find that Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than 
Protestant countries. 
3 Geneve also harbored several leading professional printers. This has contributed to the international spread of 
the Calvinist Reformation all over the world. 
4 The main sources of Calvin’s view on interest are Calvin’s commentary on Ex. 22:25, Lev. 25, Deut. 23,  Ps. 
15:5,  Ezek. 18:8,  Matt. 5:42 and Luke 6:34 and a letter sent to his friend Claude de Sachin. See also section V.6 
of Bieler (2005).  
5 Also the other Reformers, such as Luther, Melanchthon, Bullinger, Zwingly and Bucer, remained faithful to the 
medieval tradition in this point. Only at the end of his life, Luther came to accept interest and only regarded too 
high a rate of interest as usury (Bieler, 2005). 
6 Another instance in which taking interest is legitimate according to Calvin is if through ill intent the borrower 
does not repay at the fixed term. This kind of exceptions was also allowed in Catholic practice. The lender was 
authorized to claim from the borrower an indemnity called interesse when the loan caused him real damage or if 
he deprived real profit by missing other business opportunities or if the loan involved a certain risk. 
7 Sermon XCV about Deuteronomium 15:11-15 
8 Furthermore, Calvin added that we must not consider what is allowable in terms of received custom, nor assess 
what is right and fair by the standards of the world, but use the Word of God as a precept (Stückelberger 2007). 
This also holds for existing laws: Christians cannot be content with the minimum order that the law wants to 
secure, but should rather obey the standards that are determined by their faith in Christ and the love that flows 
from it. Thus, there is no formal rule of law that enables us to distinguish between legitimate lending and 
illegitimate usury. The sole rule is the rule of fairness and Jesus Christ’s Judgement. 
9 Commentary on Habakkuk 2: 15. 
10 Institutes (1560), III, x,1, section 2. 
11 But even government intervention aimed at reducing the risks of bank failure for the real economy had a perverse 
effect by providing banks even more playing room for risk taking policies.   